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DILEMMATIC DELIBERATIONS IN  
KIERKEGAARD’S FEAR AND TREMBLING
Daniel Watts
My central claim in this paper is that Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is gov-
erned by the basic aim to articulate a real dilemma, and to elicit its proper rec-
ognition as such. I begin by indicating how Kierkegaard’s works are shaped 
in general by this aim, and what the aim involves. I then show how the dilem-
matic structure of Fear and Trembling is obscured in a recent dispute between 
Michelle Kosch and John Lippitt regarding the basic aims and upshot of the 
book. Finally, I consider two critical questions: Why does Kierkegaard pres-
ent his dilemmatic reasoning in the form of a “dialectical lyric”? And why 
does he write a book that aims only to articulate a dilemma, and not also to 
resolve it?
Like other books by Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling is strikingly distinc-
tive in form and style. The following features immediately stand out. 
First, the authorial voice is attributed to one Johannes de Silentio, whom 
we are evidently supposed to regard as a distinct personage, and whose 
name already sounds a note of paradox given that this John of Silence is 
supposed to be responsible for all these words. Second, the book defies 
classification: narrative vignettes, poetic refrains, panegyric outpourings, 
thought-experiments, satirical remarks, biblical and classical allusions—
all these are intermingled with passages of dense argumentation of a kind 
more usually found in a conventional philosophical treatise. Third, the 
book is framed by an intriguing epigraph, which alludes to the story of 
the message Tarquinius conveyed to his son by getting the messenger to 
relay his wordless behaviour in a poppy field.1 The epigraph thus sparks 
the suspicion that the book is intended to convey some kind of secret mes-
sage—and commentators have been quick to follow this lead, albeit in all 
sorts of different directions. And fourth, the book departs markedly from 
familiar canons of philosophical writing in its lack of scholarly apparatus 
and intimate, self-ironizing tone.2 
1Tarquinius strikes down the heads of the tallest poppies in the field; his son understands 
that he is to put to death the leading citizens of Gabii.
2The overall impression is indeed amply summed up by the following passage from Ha-
mann which, up to the final copy, Kierkegaard apparently intended to use as an epigraph: 
“I express myself with many tongues, speak the language of sophists, of wordplay, of Cretes 
and Arabs, Whites and Moors and Creoles, babble criticism, mythology, matters of fact and 
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What, then, are we to make of the overall shape of Fear and Trembling? Its 
subtitle—“Dialectical Lyric”—encourages the thought that, notwithstand-
ing any impression of a mere admixture, its lyrical and dialectical dimen-
sions are supposed to hang together in a particular way. And we can see 
that the book does indeed hang together, I shall argue, provided we un-
derstand aright its author’s remark that “my deliberation is dilemmatic.”3 
For we shall see that Fear and Trembling is plausibly characterised as a 
whole in terms of the basic aim to articulate a particular dilemma, to show 
that this dilemma is a real one, and to elicit from the reader its proper 
recognition as such. 
I shall begin by showing how Kierkegaard’s works are shaped in gen-
eral by the aim to articulate real dilemmas, under a certain conception 
of a “real dilemma,” before turning more specifically to Fear and Trem-
bling, and to its development of a complex constructive dilemma regard-
ing Abraham and the concept of faith. This dilemma, I shall argue, is of 
continuing philosophical interest and import, presenting a challenge to 
all those who take themselves to be in a position to apply the concept of 
religious faith.
I. Kierkegaard about Dilemmas 
A few pages into his dissertation On the Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard com-
ments in characteristically sardonic vein on Xenophon’s attempts to show 
what a scandalous injustice it was for the Athenians to sentence Socrates 
to death.4 Kierkegaard surmises that Plato and the Athenians must have 
regarded Xenophon’s irenic intervention in somewhat the way that “one 
feels at times in an argument when—just as the point in dispute, precisely 
by being brought to a head, begins to become interesting—a helpful third 
party kindly takes it upon himself to reconcile the disputants, to take the 
whole matter back into a triviality.”5 Later in the dissertation, Kierkegaard 
registers a contrast with Socrates himself in this regard, commenting as 
follows on Socrates’ reflections in Plato’s Apology on whether it is better 
to live or die:
On the front of the stage, then, is Socrates—not as someone who rashly 
brushes away the thought of death and clings anxiously to life, not as some-
one who eagerly goes toward death and magnanimously sacrifices his life; 
not as someone who takes delight in the alternation of light and shadow 
first principles all mixed up, and argue now in a human way and now in an extraordinary 
way” (Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong et al., 26 volumes, 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978–2000], 6: 249–250, hereafter, cited as “KW,” 
followed by volume and page number).
3KW 6: 93.
4Xenophon’s defence only leaves Kierkegaard wondering why Plato should have taken 
it upon himself to immortalize, and the others to execute, such a “good natured, garrulous, 
droll character”—perhaps, he wryly moots, the sophisticated Athenians “wanted Socrates 
done away with because he bored them” (KW 2: 18n).
5KW 2: 16.
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found in a syllogistic aut / aut [either / or] . . . and . . . with a kind of inquisi-
tiveness longs for the solution of the riddle.6 
Against all helpful third parties, we are to juxtapose Socrates’ delight in 
the unfolding of a difficult dilemma, and in the pathos-filled search for its 
resolution. And Socrates is distinguished above all by the way in which he 
is “always prepared to set the problem afloat if it runs aground . . . always 
knows how to keep the problem in suspension, and precisely therein and 
thereby wants to resolve it.”7
That these are no passing remarks in a youthful work is already indi-
cated by the title of Kierkegaard’s first publication after the dissertation, 
Either / Or. In a telling remark in his papers, Kierkegaard makes it clear 
that this title is in no way adventitious:
That which matters most to me about the whole of Either / Or is that it be-
come really evident that the metaphysical meaning that underlies it all leads 
everywhere to the dilemma.8
It is a moot point just how the contents of Either / Or—which the reader 
is liable to find bewildering—are supposed to bring to light something in 
general about dilemmas. Certainly we may note that, in the introduction, 
our attention is drawn to the possibility that the aesthetic and ethical out-
looks voiced, respectively, in the two parts of book are not merely at odds 
but represent the internal conflict of a single mind, i.e., the mind of one 
who is both compelled and repelled by both. And it is no doubt crucial to 
the overall impact of Either / Or that, despite the way in which the rather 
self-satisfied Judge in Part II takes the moral high ground in his stolid 
defence of marriage, the melancholy note sounded in the first, aesthetic 
part remains deeply resonant throughout. But without getting embroiled 
in the details of this text, suffice it to say here that its title, together with 
Kierkegaard’s remark about what matters to him most about this work, 
clearly indicates that the idea of a dilemma enters into its most basic aims. 
Now it is difficult not to suspect that, when Kierkegaard complains 
about Xenophon’s irenic intervention, it is not primarily Xenophon he has 
in mind. For, as is well known, Kierkegaard was especially perplexed by 
the claims made by the Hegelians of his own day to have overcome the 
dichotomies of our ordinary forms of understanding, and to have discov-
ered a systematic general method for their mediation and reconciliation. 
Thus, a typical passage from Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
Hegel himself has more than once emphatically held judgement day on the 
kind of thinkers who remain in the sphere of understanding and reflection 
and who have therefore insisted that there is an either/or. Since that day, it 
6KW 2: 81.
7KW 2: 121.
8Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, 7 
vols. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978), Vol. 4: 526. Cited 
hereafter as “JP,” followed by volume and page number. 
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has become a popular game, so that as soon as someone hints at an aut / aut 
[either / or] a Hegelian comes riding trip-trap-trap on a horse . . . and wins a 
victory and rides home again . . . .9
The satirical figure of the knights of infinite mediation recalls the first lines 
of the dissertation, in which Kierkegaard had also depicted philosophers 
as knights of the Idea, riding out to seize hold of “the phenomenon,” add-
ing, however, that in this chivalric adventure “one sometimes hears too 
much of the jangling of spurs and the voice of the master.”10 Needless to 
say, it turns out on Kierkegaard’s view that Socrates is one phenomenon 
that is not so easily mastered. 
As the image of the trip-trapping Hegelians also illustrates, Kierkeg-
aard’s polemical orientation in this regard is especially marked by his per-
ception of the merely mechanical way in which general methodological 
procedures are applied to particular philosophical problems. For what he 
thinks this indicates is the absence of the characteristic affective dimen-
sion or pathos that attends the genuine recognition of an either / or, the 
feeling of push and pull, of perplexity and disorientation, of longing for 
a way out. And what Kierkegaard says of paradox surely goes as well for 
dilemma when he writes for example that “paradox is the real pathos of 
intellectual life.”11 The affective dimension appropriate to an engagement 
with particular paradoxes and dilemmas is evidently crucial in Kierkeg-
aard’s view if we are to avoid the danger in philosophy that our inquiries 
become glib and pointless.12 
Whether any of this is fair to Hegel or the Hegelians closer to Kierkeg-
aard’s home it is no part of my aim to adjudicate here. But what is clear 
is that, early in his writing career, Kierkegaard formed the view that the 
milieu of his day was scarcely conducive to the proper recognition of real 
dilemmas as such, and that what was needed was someone to act, in the 
spirit of Socrates, to resist the overtures of all these helpful third parties. 
We ought to ask what kind of dilemmas are at stake in this aim, however, 
and in what sense “real” ones. Kierkegaard does not expressly reflect at 
length on his practice in this regard, and we shall turn to an example of his 
9KW 12.1: 306.
10KW 2: 9. Later in the dissertation, one such master is named: “when the phenomena are 
paraded” Kierkegaard writes “Hegel . . . is in too much of a hurry and is too aware of the 
great importance of his role as commander-in-chief of world history to take time for the more 
than the royal glimpse he allows to glide over them” (KW 2: 222).
11JP 3: 399. Compare Kierkegaard’s remark that “the thinker without a paradox is like a 
lover without passion—a paltry mediocrity” (KW 7: 37). 
12Compare in this connection one of Wittgenstein’s more acerbic remarks: “Some philoso-
phers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called ‘loss of problems’. 
Then everything seems quite simple to them, no deep problems seem to exist anymore, the 
world becomes broad and flat and loses all depth, and what they write becomes immeasur-
ably shallow and trivial” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von 
Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §455). Wittgenstein goes on to 
single out Russell and H. G. Wells as victims of “loss of problems,” but Kierkegaard would 
surely have recognized the phenomenon.
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practice shortly, but let me approach this question obliquely, by forestall-
ing some likely misconceptions.
First, Kierkegaard is sometimes associated with a choice between ra-
tionally indifferent but mutually exclusive options. On one fairly stan-
dard picture, what we are offered in Kierkegaard’s works is a trilemma 
between aesthetic, ethical and religious life-style options, informed that 
we have no rational grounds for choosing between these standpoints, and 
invited to take the leap, and plump for one or another.13 Among the many 
problems with this picture, however, is that it makes it quite obscure why 
Kierkegaard should characterize his mode of communication as he does 
in terms of “dialectical knots” which it is left for the reader to untie.14 Far 
from evoking the idea of liberty of indifference, this image clearly echoes 
Aristotle’s well-known characterisation of an aporia in terms of a “knot 
in the object” and indicates a thorough entanglement of reasons pro and 
contra.15 Kierkegaardian dilemmas seem closer in this regard to the sorts of 
cases Gilbert Ryle had in mind when he remarked that in certain disputes 
“we often find one and the same thinker—very likely oneself—strongly 
inclined to champion both sides and yet, at the very same time, strongly 
inclined entirely to repudiate one of them just because he is strongly in-
clined to support the other.”16
Second, whilst it is certainly plausible to associate with Kierkegaard the 
idea of dilemmas that are in some sense real ones, there is no good reason 
to attribute to him some version of the theory that there exists a plurality 
of incommensurable goods, such that it is knowable a priori that there ex-
ist irresolvable dilemmas. For one thing, the claim to know that there exist 
irreconcilable collisions of this kind is a rather strong claim to knowledge, 
and one that sits uneasily with Kierkegaard’s avowed attempts to take 
seriously the standpoint of Socratic ignorance. For another thing, as the 
title of one of his religious discourses already indicates—“Purity of Heart 
is to Will one Thing”—Kierkegaard’s sympathies are, to the contrary, with 
those who affirm the unity of the Good. What is clear, however, is that Ki-
erkegaard thinks there are dilemmas that do not admit of a certain kind of 
resolution: namely, the kind that consists in showing that the two sides of 
an apparent dilemma are really just two sides of the same conceptual coin.
Third, one might naturally suppose that Kierkegaard’s interest at-
taches solely to practical dilemmas, i.e., to practical rather than intellectual 
13On this picture, it is as though Kierkegaard were saying, as John Elrod put it, “My dear 
reader, these are the existence possibilities open to you; take your choice” (John W. Elrod, 
Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1975], 4).
14Compare the remark in Kierkegaard’s Practice in Christianity that “it is indirect commu-
nication to place jest and earnestness together in such a way that the composite is a dialecti-
cal knot—and then to be a nobody oneself. If anyone wants to have anything to do with this 
kind of communication, he will have to untie the knot himself” (KW 20: 133). 
15For Kierkegaard’s express repudiation of liberum arbitrium see, for example, JP 5.11: 59. 
For the figure of the dialectical knot see Aristotle, Metaphysics III.1, 995a29–30.
16Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 1.
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ones. After all, it is a notable feature of his works to have to do with such 
eminently practical matters as whether or not to get married; and it is a 
characteristic complaint of his that, when problems of a basically practical 
nature are approached in a basically theoretical way, method and prob-
lem pass one another by. One thing Kierkegaard also often emphasized, 
however, is that thinking is itself a kind of activity; and, as we shall see in 
the case of Fear and Trembling, his work does centrally involve the articula-
tion of dilemmas about what to think about certain things (including mar-
riage). Indeed, we can give a recognizably Kierkegaardian gloss on the 
notion in general of a “real dilemma” in terms of the claim that, when we 
attend closely to certain real-life phenomena, we find ourselves assailed 
by dilemmas regarding what to think about them, such that these dilem-
mas do not admit of conceptual mediation. Plausibly, the lives of Socrates, 
Christ and Abraham are central examples of phenomena that Kierkegaard 
regarded as posing real dilemmas for thought.
Let us turn, then, to Fear and Trembling and to its treatment of Abra-
ham’s dilemma.
II. A Dispute about Fear and Trembling 
According to the Genesis narrative, Abraham faced an appalling dilem-
ma: either to disobey God, who thus far had lead him so faithfully and who 
had promised to make him father of many nations through his beloved 
Isaac, or to violate his sacred duties to his son, and set out on the lonely 
journey to Moriah. Abraham, as we know, grasps one horn, makes the 
journey, lifts the knife—and God substitutes the ram. But Fear and Trem-
bling works to disrupt any tendency on our part to read this story in the 
light of its end, drawing out the sheer horror of Abraham’s journey.17 
Fear and Trembling is not solely constituted by the attempt to depict 
Abraham’s dilemma, however. For its author evidently thinks that we (for 
some “we”) face a real dilemma when we reflect on this story, and on its 
implications for our understanding of faith. Indeed, as I shall argue, de 
Silentio’s dialectical lyric is plausibly characterized as a whole by the aim 
to articulate a real dilemma about Abraham, and in such a way as to elicit 
its proper recognition as such. In order to bring out what is at stake in this 
claim, however, let me first lay out the main lines of a recent dispute about 
the most basic aims and upshot of the book. 
In a recent paper, Michelle Kosch claims that Fear and Trembling does 
indeed have a secret message, and the message is that it is impossible 
for the biblical Abraham, or indeed anyone else, to serve as an exemplar 
of faith:
Abraham is taken to be faith’s most eminent representative, and Johannes 
de silentio has (unwittingly) conveyed the message that in order to survive 
17For an illuminating account of this dimension of Fear and Trembling see Lasse Horne 
Kjaelgaard, “‘The Peak on Which Abraham Stands’: The Pregnant Moment of Søren Kierkeg-
aard’s Fear and Trembling,” Journal of the History of Ideas 63.2 (2002): 303–321. 
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in the terrain of faith the reader must eliminate him, along with every other 
example.18
We may begin to reconstruct Kosch’s argument for this arresting conclu-
sion by distinguishing two levels of interpretation. On the first level—the 
level of what Kosch calls the manifest content of the book—we are to at-
tribute to de Silentio something like the following style of reasoning; call 
it the Manifest Argument: 
1. Abraham is an exemplar of faith
2. If Abraham is an exemplar of faith then (to echo de Silentio’s domi-
nant economic imagery) the life of faith is far more costly than it’s 
often made out to be.
 Therefore: the life of faith is far more costly than it’s often made 
out to be.
At the surface level, then, we are invited to read the book as an attempt 
to “jack up the price of faith” by emphasizing just how demanding Abra-
ham’s ordeal really was. This, for example, seems to be the import of de 
Silentio’s well-known characterization of faith as a double-movement of 
resignation and affirmation, where Abraham’s conduct supposedly ex-
presses his extraordinary ability not only to give up Isaac, but also to give 
up his overwhelming reasons to expect that, once the deed is done, Isaac 
will no longer be around. 
Nonetheless Kosch thinks we must keep in mind here how Tarquinius’s 
message to his son was unwittingly passed on by the messenger; for she 
wants to show that Johannes de Silentio is intended by Kierkegaard to 
convey to his readers the covert message that they must jettison Abraham 
qua model of the life of faith. The way to decode this message, she thinks, 
is to see that, and why, the Manifest Argument signally fails. In short, the 
Real Argument of the book runs something like this:
1. No claim of the form “X exemplifies faith” can be known to be 
true.
2. If it is possible that X serves as an exemplar of F then X is F and X 
can be known to be F.
 Therefore nothing could possibly serve as an exemplar of faith.
If this argument is sound, it should be clear that the first premise of the 
Manifest Argument is false, and necessarily so. It cannot possibly be that 
Abraham serves as an exemplar of faith, according to this argument, since 
no-one can be known to be an example of faith and it must be possible to 
know of any exemplar that it is an example of whatever it serves to rep-
resent. How, then, does Kosch try to establish that this is indeed the Real 
18Michelle Kosch, “What Abraham Couldn’t Say,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 82 (2008): 77.
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Argument of Fear and Trembling? We may note that she says nothing to 
establish the attribution to Kierkegaard of the second premise of this argu-
ment—though she clearly needs this, and it is far from obviously true. But 
the two major strands in the defence of her attribution to Kierkegaard of 
the first premise are as follows. 
First of all, Kosch flags up a puzzle regarding Johannes’ defence of the 
Manifest Argument. The puzzle is that there is a gaping hole in this de-
fence, since he makes no attempt to establish its first premise. De Silentio 
merely stipulates that Abraham really is a “knight of faith,” that he really 
does have a command from God, that he really isn’t a lunatic or evil-doer. 
But these stipulations are of course no help whatsoever in the defence of 
the Manifest Argument. And this is especially puzzling if we suppose that 
the aim of the book is to show that the life of faith is more demanding than 
folks these days like to think. For as we know, one man’s modus ponens is 
another man’s modus tollens and, as Kierkegaard certainly knew, folks like 
Kant and Hegel were denying that appropriating the concept of religious 
faith requires regarding Abraham’s conduct as exemplary. Kant, indeed, 
can scarcely contain his indignation: 
in some cases the human being can be sure that the voice he hears is not 
God’s; for if the voice commands him to do something contrary to the moral 
law, then no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no matter how 
it may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must consider it an illusion. 
*We can use, as an example, the myth of the sacrifice that Abraham was 
going to make by butchering and burning his only son at God’s command 
(the poor child, without knowing it, even brought the wood for the fire). 
Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “That I ought 
not to kill my good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are 
God—of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice rings 
down to me from (visible) heaven.”19 
How then could the Manifest Argument of Fear and Trembling be expected 
to bite against more enlightened accounts of the concept of faith such as 
those advanced by Kant and Hegel or for those denizens of Danish Chris-
tendom who might be open to such accounts? 
Secondly, Kosch homes in on de Silentio’s claim that Abraham’s ordeal 
is such that he cannot speak, cannot disclose himself, cannot give reasons 
for his conduct. The only grounds on which de Silentio could intelligibly 
base this claim, she argues, is that, even if Abraham really is justified by 
God, he could never know that he is so justified and could therefore have 
no warrant to appeal to this justification as a reason for doing what he 
does. That is, de Silentio must think Abraham has in principle no way 
of distinguishing between the case in which he is a genuine exemplar of 
faith, justified by God, from the case in which he is a lunatic or evil-doer. 
19Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood and George di 
Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 263. The sentences following the 
asterisk appear as a footnote in the text.
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But if that is his explanation for Abraham’s silence, Kosch reasons, it fol-
lows from de Silentio’s view that no genuine example of faith could ever 
be recognized as such, and he surely ought to draw the entailment that 
nothing could serve as its exemplar. And, in that case, he undercuts his 
own claims to know that Abraham is an example of faith. If de Silentio fails 
to draw these implications, however, Kosch thinks Kierkegaard does not, 
and expects his readers to get the message.
Now one question we might register here is why anyone who wanted 
to defend what Kosch presents as the Real Argument of the book would 
go to such elaborate lengths to appear not to do so. Given these aims, 
what could be gained by the subterfuge? This question is especially 
pressing in the light of the fact that there is reason to doubt that Ki-
erkegaard believed the conclusion of this argument. Thus, in his reply to 
Kosch, John Lippitt is able to draw on many texts in which Kierkegaard 
apparently relies on the possibility of religious exemplars.20 Lippitt’s 
basic move, however, is to defend the attribution to Kierkegaard of the 
Manifest Argument whilst denying that he even purports to demonstrate 
its first premise. Rather, Lippitt claims, the argumentative force of this 
text crucially turns on an antecedent commitment to Abraham’s status 
as a hero of faith, in a way that reflects Kierkegaard’s orthodox view of 
scriptural authority.21 Accordingly, Lippitt denies that the book sets out 
to provide arguments with probative force for those who do not share 
this prior commitment. 
Putting aside the issue of subterfuge, it thus turns out on the views of 
both Kosch and Lippitt that Fear and Trembling can have little to say to 
those who do not already regard Abraham as a religious hero. Now one 
might find this result disappointing: for one might have hoped the book 
would cast its critical net wider than a certain sort of religious conserva-
tive. For reasons I shall come to shortly, I think it does. 
For his part, Lippitt goes on to defend a very different account of the 
“message” of Fear and Trembling, which appeals to a distinctively Chris-
tian, typological reading of the Biblical story. To consider this rival inter-
pretative framework would take us too far afield, but the important point 
for our purposes here is that he evidently thinks this reading is wholly 
compatible with, and indeed relies upon, Abraham’s status as a religious 
20Consider, for an example Lippitt doesn’t cite, the following from Kierkegaard’s Jour-
nals: “With the aid of mediocrity’s cheap dishonesty, Christendom has managed to lose the 
prototypes completely. We need to reintroduce the prototypes, make them recognizable, 
something that can be done only by: Either/Or. Either you have quality in common, or you 
are on another qualitative level—but not this ‘also—well, not quite, but nevertheless—also’” 
(JP 2: 299).
21Thus Lippitt writes, “Kosch worries that Fear and Trembling’s verdict on Abraham . . . is 
‘as likely to drive the bourgeois Christian into the arms of Kant et. al. as to succeed in driving 
up the price of faith’ . . . What we need, she argues, is an antecedent commitment to taking 
Abraham as a model of faith. But for Kierkegaard, I submit, that antecedent commitment 
is simply scriptural authority” (John Lippitt, “What Neither Abraham Nor Johannes de Si-
lentio Could Say,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (2008): 84).
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exemplar.22 So it ought to be clear that Lippitt’s view stands directly op-
posed to Kosch’s: on the one account, the aim is to show that there can be 
no exemplars of faith, Abraham included; on the other account, the aim is 
to examine what follows from the view that Abraham is an exemplar of 
faith, where this view is treated as a prior commitment. 
For this reason, I take it that we may not regard this dispute, in an 
ecumenical spirit, merely as a happy function of the plenitude of inter-
pretative possibilities thrown up by Kierkegaard’s text. Indeed, we face 
something of a puzzle here: for it is natural to wonder why sophisticated 
readers are able to cite substantial textual evidence on behalf of contrary 
characterizations of a book’s most basic aims. Of course one might, in a 
less generous spirit, regard this as a lamentable function of the confused 
state of Kierkegaard’s thought. In the final section of this paper, I shall 
advance a simple but hopefully more satisfying hypothesis: viz. that the 
dispute between Kosch and Lippitt merely reproduces the dilemma which 
it is the most basic aim of Fear and Trembling to articulate.23
III. A Dilemma about Abraham
One point on which Kosch and Lippitt are agreed is that it is “implausibly 
simplistic to read Fear and Trembling as arguing straightforwardly for the 
superiority of ‘the religious’ to ‘the ethical.’”24 And one thing that to my 
mind tells decisively against any such reading is that de Silentio repeated-
ly draws our attention to the merely dilemmatic structure of his reasoning. 
At one point, for just one example, he envisages conditions under which 
we might suppose that “we are in the presence of the paradox [of faith],” 
adding, however, that we may suppose this only if we may suppose that 
“there is any [such paradox] at all (for my deliberation is dilemmatic).”25 
And over and again he sums up his deliberations in an expressly dilem-
matic form: either Abraham exemplifies the paradox of faith or we lose 
Abraham. So far as the manifest content of this text goes, at least, there is 
no impression of its having established either disjunct of this conclusion.
Whilst I am certainly not the first reader to have noticed that Fear and 
Trembling articulates a dilemma, I think the full significance of this fact 
is often missed, and is seriously obscured by the recent dispute between 
22The case for the interpretation Lippitt favours has been developed with great subtlety 
by Stephen Mulhall in his Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). We may note in passing, however, that it is 
doubtful whether Mulhall’s reading is compatible with an appeal to Abraham as a reli-
gious exemplar, at least in the sense of a model to be followed. For, on this typological 
reading, the story of the binding of Isaac is to be understood as a symbol of the Christian 
story of redemption wherein Abraham stands to Isaac as God the Father stands to God 
the Son: and Abraham’s conduct must be regarded as wholly indefensible apart from this 
symbolism. 
23I hope this makes me the sort of helpful third-party to a dispute who avoids the charge 
of reducing it all to a triviality!
24Lippitt, “What Neither Abraham Nor Johannes de Silentio Could Say,” 80.
25KW 6: 93.
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Kosch and Lippitt.26 In particular, a proper appreciation of the expressly 
“dilemmatic” form of de Silentio’s deliberations, I want to suggest, en-
ables us to see how these deliberations can have force, not only for those 
who already regard themselves as spiritual heirs of Abraham, but also 
for those who might be quite prepared to dissociate the concept of reli-
gious faith from the Biblical Abraham. In my view, the central argument 
advanced in Fear and Trembling presents a challenge, not just to the deni-
zens of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom, inasmuch as these can 
be presumed to have had a prior commitment to Abraham’s authoritative 
status, but to us all, inasmuch as we take ourselves to know what it means 
to have religious faith. 
What, then, is the specific content of Johannes’ dilemmatic delibera-
tions? It appears that the overall line of his argument has the form of the 
complex constructive dilemma, the major premise of which, for want of a 
pithy formulation, is this:
(First Conjunct) If Abraham’s conduct is defensible on distinctively re-
ligious grounds, then three paradoxical consequences follow: it must 
be possible for there to be (i) a teleological suspension of the ethical (at 
least on some conception of the ethical); (ii) an overriding duty to God; 
and (iii) conditions in which, barring aesthetic reasons, one is justified 
in failing to satisfy the demands of ethical disclosure; and 
(Second Conjunct) if Abraham’s conduct is not defensible on distinctive-
ly religious grounds, then (at least) two paradoxical consequences fol-
low: (i) there can be no warrant of any kind for an appeal to Abraham 
qua exemplar of faith and (ii) nothing hitherto experienced counts as an 
instance of faith.
The minor premise, of course, is that either Abraham’s conduct is defen-
sible on religious grounds or it is not; from all of which it is supposed to 
follow that either we must admit the paradoxical possibility of a teleologi-
cal suspension of the ethical (and etc.), or we must bite the bullet there 
can be no grounds of any kind for an appeal to Abraham qua hero of faith, 
and, moreover, no grounds for regarding anything hitherto observed 
as an instance of faith.27 Establishing this argument is the burden of the 
26On the hypothetical, dilemmatic character of de Silentio’s reasoning see, for example, 
Alistair Hanney’s introduction in Søren Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling (London: Penguin, 
1985); Merold Westphal, “Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference” in Interna-
tional Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical Fragments and Repetition, ed. Robert L. Perkins 
(Mercer University Press: Macon, 1994), 14; Claire Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling 
(London: Continuum, 2010).
27It is sometimes argued that arguments of this form are fallacious, on the grounds that 
such arguments could be valid only if their conclusions were to specify a non-exhaustive 
disjunction, in which case, however, the minor premise would be redundant. Suffice it to 
say here that Johannes’ argument may be recast, in a valid form at least, as follows: (1) If a 
teleological suspension of the ethical (and etc.) is not possible, then Abraham’s conduct is 
not defensible on religious grounds; (2) If Abraham’s conduct is not defensible on religious 
grounds, there can be no grounds for an appeal to his conduct as exemplary of faith, nor for 
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“Problemata” sections of the book and I should emphasize that it is not 
my aim here to defend it. Against the background of the dispute between 
Kosch and Lippitt, however, we may observe the following about Jo-
hannes’ dilemmatic argument strategy as such. 
First, both disjuncts of de Silentio’s conclusion are clearly intended to 
strike the reader as jarring and paradoxical. It is not the case, therefore, 
that we are simply left to make a further judgement as to which of the two 
options in play is the better supported. That is, not only does de Silentio 
establish no decisive case for either side of his dilemma; he presents both 
sides as horns. And we may note especially in this regard the claim that 
if Abraham’s conduct is not defensible on religious grounds, there can be 
no warrant for regarding him as an exemplar of faith and, moreover, no 
grounds for subsuming anything hitherto observed under the concept of 
faith. Now it is of course true that the first of these consequences will ap-
pear paradoxical only to those who are otherwise disposed in some way 
to regard Abraham as a religious hero.28 Indeed, de Silentio makes it quite 
plain that his proximal target is what he regards as the dishonest attempt 
of those who would have their cake and eat it in this respect. But the same 
is surely not true of the arresting claim that it also follows that faith has 
never yet been exemplified. This claim is perfectly explicit in the text and 
is indeed reiterated. To cite just one:
And yet faith is this paradox, or else (and I ask the reader to bear these 
consequences in mente even though it would be too prolix for me to write 
them all down) or else faith has never existed simply because it has always 
existed, or else Abraham is lost.29
This is a strong claim, and its defence crucially relies on de Silentio’s vari-
ous attempts to show that only the special sort of dilemma Abraham faces 
could have a distinctively religious (rather than an aesthetic or ethical) 
character. But notice the paradoxical form in which de Silentio chooses 
to present the consequence that faith has never yet been instantiated: this 
is so, he says, because faith has always been instantiated. What can this 
mean? I suppose it means that faith, properly speaking, has never been 
exemplified just because, on this horn of the dilemma, all that has only 
ever been exemplified is merely “faith” in the bowdlerised sense of mod-
ern philosophy, the sense in which faith is brought into “the rather com-
monplace company of feelings, moods, idiosyncrasies, vapeurs etc.,” the 
realm of “first immediacy.”30 On this side of the dilemma, therefore, no 
distinctively religious application of the term “faith” could be warranted 
regarding anything hitherto observed as an instance of faith. Therefore: if a teleological sus-
pension (and etc.) is not possible, there can be no grounds for an appeal to Abraham’s conduct 
as exemplary of faith, nor for regarding anything hitherto observed as an instance of faith.
28There can surely be no doubt that, in the opening sections of the book, de Silentio aims 
to foster this disposition.
29KW 6: 56.
30KW 6: 69.
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by appeal to a given exemplar; for, according to de Silentio’s argument, if 
Abraham does not exemplify faith in a distinctively religious sense, no one 
ever has. And that surely would be an uncomfortable conclusion, not for 
the hyper-orthodox, but for those who would lay claim to the concept of 
faith whilst doing away with Abraham. 
Secondly, the claim that Abraham is justified, despite his inability to 
speak in the way putatively required by the demands of ethical disclosure, 
is itself merely conditional on the supposition that his conduct is defen-
sible on religious grounds. Pace Kosch, the claim that Abraham’s silence is 
both necessary and justified is not something de Silentio claims to know, it 
is something he infers as a consequence of the undischarged supposition 
that Abraham’s conduct is defensible on religious grounds.
And thirdly, and pace Lippitt, nowhere does de Silentio indicate that 
the reasons against regarding Abraham’s conduct as heroic—the reasons 
for finding his conduct repellent and horrific—can be rebuffed merely by 
appeal to scriptural authority. To be sure, de Silentio’s argument strat-
egy is evidently designed to have special purchase against those who, as 
professing Christians, profess to belong to one of the religious traditions 
in which Abraham’s example is accepted as authoritative, but whose as-
similation of the views of modern philosophers puts them at odds with 
this profession. Fear and Trembling thus reflects the aim, no doubt behind 
much of Kierkegaard’s work, to elicit from the denizens of Christendom 
the sober acknowledgement that, hiding behind Hegelian talk of “media-
tion,” they take seriously neither the claims of pagan philosophy nor of 
Christianity.31 But it does not follow that de Silentio’s argument can have 
probative force only for those who already adopt an orthodox view of 
scriptural authority. This would indeed be the case if his deliberations 
were well represented (as both Kosch and Lippitt appear to think) by a 
simple argument modus ponens from the claim that Abraham exemplifies 
faith to a conclusion about the nature of faith; but this plainly fails to do 
justice to their dilemmatic form. Moreover, it is not the case that an as-
sumed commitment to the authority of scripture is de Silentio’s only basis 
for presenting as problematic the conclusion that Abraham was a lunatic 
or an evil-doer. As we have emphasized, that we “lose Abraham” is not 
in de Silentio’s view the only problematic consequence on this horn of the 
dilemma; for he further argues that if Abraham doesn’t exemplify faith, in 
a distinctively religious sense, then no one ever has.
31Compare Philosophical Fragments, which begins with the Shakespearian motto, “better 
well hanged than ill wed,” and ends with “the moral” that “to go beyond Socrates when one 
says essentially the same as Socrates, only not nearly so well—that at least is not Socratic” 
(KW 7: 3; 111); and the following from Postscript: “That someone prefers paganism to Chris-
tianity is not at all confusing, but to make paganism out to be the highest within Christianity 
is an injustice both to Christianity, which becomes something different from what it is, and 
to paganism, which becomes nothing whatsoever, though it was indeed something” (KW 
12.1: 361). For a helpful discussion of the role of Fear and Trembling in Kierkegaard’s attack 
on Christendom see C. Stephen Evans’s introduction in Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, trans. 
Sylvia Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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These features of the argument strategy of Fear and Trembling begin to 
indicate that its manifest aim is the broadly Socratic one of inducing in its 
addressees a state of aporia about its central concept, by articulating a par-
ticular dilemma regarding that concept. If so, and to the extent that they 
are compelling, de Silentio’s dilemmatic deliberations present a problem 
to all those who regard themselves as in a position to apply the concept of 
religious faith, not just to those who already venerate Abraham, or the hy-
per-orthodox, or even those who regard themselves as religious. Attend-
ing to their dilemmatic form thus allows us to see how these deliberations 
present an on-going challenge to philosophers of religion and professed 
believers, including those who would prefer to interpret religious faith in 
a way that does not imply anything so unpalatable as the possibility of a 
teleological suspension of the ethical, or an absolute duty to God, or justi-
fied silence in the face of the demands of ethical disclosure; for the overall 
upshot of de Silentio’s manifest argument is that we must either somehow 
come to terms with these paradoxical consequences of taking seriously the 
Biblical Abraham, or else acknowledge that we have no real use for the 
concept of religious faith.
One relatively straightforward gloss on the significance of de Silentio’s 
name is that he remains silent about how his central dilemma is to be 
resolved. This is not to preclude that his silence conveys some sort of co-
vert message, however. On the contrary, extending the comparison with 
Plato, we might expect this aporematic text to have a proleptic dimension, 
providing hints as to how the problem might be further worked through, 
and pointing forward, perhaps, to other works.32 It hardly seems unlikely, 
moreover, that Kierkegaard has designed this text, qua dialectical knot, in 
such a way that we also face a dilemma about Johannes, whether or not he 
is to be trusted, so that our confrontation with dilemma ramifies through 
each level of interpretation, so to speak. Nonetheless, it is surely a minimal 
constraint on a plausible reading of this text that it does not merely as-
sume that the dilemma at the centre of its manifest content has somehow 
been resolved. 
I have been trying to bring out the dilemmatic structure of Fear and 
Trembling, by showing how this structure is obscured in the interpreta-
tions offered by both Kosch and Lippitt. But one might object that my 
characterisation fails to do justice to the lyrical or non-discursive aspects 
of the book, focussing as it does on de Silentio’s mode of reasoning. And 
32We do indeed find references to Fear and Trembling in other works by Kierkegaard, and 
such as to indicate that he thinks de Silentio’s dilemmatic deliberations are far from the last 
words on the topic. Thus, in Postscript, we read that de Silentio’s poetic portrayal of Abra-
ham qua knight of faith is a “rash anticipation,” in that it fails properly to address the deep 
problems Climacus thinks are involved in the very attempt to poetically portray an example 
of religious faith (KW 12.1: 500n). Whilst I disagree with Kosch that this passage betrays Ki-
erkegaard’s real doctrine that nothing can possibly serve as a religious exemplar, I do think 
it shows that we would be too quick to suppose that Kierkegaard’s own preferred solution 
to de Silentio’s dilemma is simply to affirm the consequences he infers from the supposition 
that Abraham was a knight of faith. 
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one might still wonder why, if the basic aim is to defend a constructive 
dilemma, Kierkegaard should have pursued this straight-forward aim in 
so quixotic a way. 
Now, Fear and Trembling certainly does more than merely draw out a set 
of consequences from the hypothesis that Abraham was justified in set-
ting out for Moriah and a set of consequences from the hypothesis that he 
was not. Nonetheless, the lyrical dimensions of the book are plausibly in 
the service of Johannes’ dilemmatic deliberations, and in two main ways. 
Firstly, as the title of the opening section of the book might lead us to 
expect—variously translated “Attunement,” “Prelude,” “Proem,” “Exor-
dium”—the lyrical dimensions serve to attune us to thinking in a concrete 
and specific way about Abraham, so that we are better able to study close-
ly what is special about his case. As we have noted, the claim that Abra-
ham’s dilemma is utterly distinctive—without analogy in cases of tragic 
heroism, for example—is a crucial step in de Silentio’s argument. And, 
second, the lyrical dimensions of the book serve to sharpen the pathos 
of the dilemma, calling on us one moment to attend to magnificent and 
noble aspects of the story, the next to that which is disturbing and horrific. 
In this way, Fear and Trembling seeks not merely to advance a dilemmatic 
argument, but to do so in such a way as to elicit the kind of pathos that is 
characteristic of the proper recognition of a real dilemma as such.
Finally, let me briefly consider a further question which becomes press-
ing, given my characterisation of Kierkegaard’s aims. The puzzle is simply 
why an author would set out with the aim merely to articulate a dilemma, 
and not also to resolve it.
No doubt Kierkegaard’s aims are informed in this regard by his opposi-
tion to Hegelian “mediation.” But the rationale for a merely dilemmatic 
form of deliberation runs deeper. For Kierkegaard evidently thinks that 
the issue about Abraham is ultimately an existential dilemma—that is, a 
dilemma in which one’s very being and identity are at stake. In the case 
of Fear and Trembling, the question, ultimately, is whether I am able to in-
herit a religious tradition that regards Abraham’s conduct as exemplary or 
whether I am able to live without appeal to the concept of faith. And when 
philosophy has to do with questions of this kind, it is a good Kierkegaard-
ian point that no one else can do philosophy for you. The highest role a 
teacher could play in this regard is that of the Socratic midwife, whose art 
is to enable the learner, as Kierkegaard liked to say, “to stand alone—by 
another’s help.”33 It is a difficult further question, no doubt, how exactly 
we should understand the notion of an existential dilemma. But it is clear 
that Kierkegaard’s restricted aim to articulate dilemmas is based in his 
sense of the irreducibly first-personal and existentially constitutive nature 
of the issues ultimately at stake. 
It is also a further question how we are to judge Fear and Trembling, mea-
sured against the aim to articulate a real dilemma about Abraham, and to 
33JP 1: 280.
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elicit its proper recognition as such. But I do hope to have shown that the 
central argument through which the book pursues this aim is of more than 
merely historical interest, and cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it 
begs the question by simply assuming the authoritative status of the Bibli-
cal Abraham. And I hope to have shown that it is only when we measure 
the book against this aim that we are able to regard it, not as a motley col-
lection of disparate elements and contradictory messages, but as a poem 
of a properly philosophical kind, a dialectical lyric.34 
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